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NOTES AND COMMENTS
EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY:
A CASE FOR THE CHILDREN
INTRODUCTION

Children are at once our most precious national resource and our
most vulnerable minority. Education-and for the overwhelming number of American children that means public school education-is our
best hope of developing that resource to its fullest potential. Education
is basic to the exercise of even those interests recognized by the United
States Supreme Court as so fundamental that they constitutionally require special protection.' Its infringement is a denial of what Americans
have always professed to value most about the theory of our system:
the opportunity to begin adult life free of competitive disadvantage,
save that of a wholly personal nature.
So well have these principles been recognized that, since the late
nineteenth century, state constitutions have typically made education
a state responsibility to be met by the legislature in establishing and
maintaining a system of free public schools. 2 Within all but one3 of
the state systems, however, great disparities in funds and facilities
can be found from school district to school district.4 School financing
schemes have, with legislative sanction, remained tied to the locally
collected and retained real property tax and thus to local wealth; 5
the disparities attest to the inability of patchwork state "equalization"
plans to modify that basic structure. Fiscal commitment has simply not
followed the policy recognition of responsibility.
1 A classification that might infringe upon the voting interest, for example, has been
held to require very strict judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause. Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
2 See, e.g., CAL CONsT. art. IX, § 5 (1879); FLA. CONsr. art IX, § 1 (1968), formerly
FLA. CONST. art XII, § 1 (1885), derived from FLA. CONST art. VIII, § 2 (1868); ILL. CONST.
art. X, § 1 (1970), formerly ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1870); MICH. CONsr. art. VIII, § 2
(1963), revised from MIcH. CONsT. art. XI, § 9 (1908); MINN. CONsr. art. VIII, § 1 (1857);
N.Y. CONsr. art. XI, § 1 (1938), formerly N.Y. CONST. art IX, § 1 (1894); VA. CONST. art
VIII, § 1 (1971), formerly VA. CONSr. art. VIII, § 129 (1902).
See generally A. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS: THE PROMISE OF EQuAL EDuCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 93-118 (1968) [hereinafter WISE]. Primitive forms of state aid were
probably available to school districts in the early 1800's. Status and Impact of Educational
Finance Programs, 4 NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL FINANCE PROJECT 1-2 (1971)

[hereinafter 4

NEFP].
3 Hawaii has a completely centralized system of school finance. 6 HAWAII Rzv. LAws
ch.39 (supp. 1965).
4 See notes 11-12, 80-83 and accompanying text infra.

5 Wealth is used throughout in the specialized sense of a district's assessed valuation
per pupil.
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Until 1968, resource distribution inequities that would have been
considered intolerable in any other area of state-provided service went
unchallenged in school finance arrangements. At that time, the systems
came under vigorous attack but the initial skirmishes were highly discouraging, from both legal and practical standpoints, for the challengers.6
SERRANO V. PRIEST

Against this background, the California Supreme Court recently
indicated that that state's educational financing scheme will probably
soon be held void under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause.7 The rationale was that the California plan unconstitutionally
conditions the full enjoyment of a fundamental interest on a wealth
classification. The court's holding in Serrano v. Priest is as potentially
far-reaching in its political and sociological impact as in its constitutional law implications. The ruling came on an appeal from an order
of dismissal entered by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.8
The dismissal had been affirmed by California's Court of Appeal for
the Second District.9
The class action was brought by elementary, intermediate, junior
high and high school students of Los Angeles County on behalf of all
California public school students except those
[i]n that school district, the identity of which is presently unknown,
which.., affords the greatest educational opportunity of all .... 10
They were joined by their parents and guardians (residents and property owners of Los Angeles County) acting on behalf of all parents of
children in the California school system who are real property owners.
Defendants were the Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction
and Controller of the State of California and, in a representative capacity, the Tax Collector and Treasurer of Los Angeles County.
Plaintiffs cited wealth" differentials of over 100 to 1 among Los
Angeles County school districts2 resulting in per pupil expenditures
0 See Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. (1969), affd mem., 397 U.S.
44 (1970); Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. IM. 1968) aff'd mem. sub nom.
McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).

7 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971) (6-1).
8 Serrano v. Priest, Civil No. 938254 (Cal. Sup. Ct., demurrers sustained, Jan. 8, 1969;
dismissed, Mar. 17, 1969).
9 Serrano v. Priest, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345 (2d Ct. App. 1970).
10 Complaint at 8, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1971).
11 See note 5 supra.
12 Complaint Exhibit "B", Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 601 (1971).
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which ranged from $1,317.64 to $428.34 among the elementary school
districts of that county in 1966-1967.13 The legislative scheme authorizing such gross differences was alleged to violate the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the "fundamental law and
Constitution of the State of California."' 4 A non-equal protection claim
was that the financing system was void under Article IX, section 5 of
the California Constitution directing the legislature to provide "a system of common schools."' 15
With its heavy dependence on local taxes, 16 the financing system
was said to deny to plaintiff children, "educational opportunities substantially equal to those enjoyed by children... in... other districts
of the state,"' 1 by unconstitutionally making the quality of their education "a function of the wealth of... [their] parents and neighbors"'18
and of "the geographical accident of... [their] school district ....
Equal protection was alleged to have been denied California parents
in that, "as a direct result of the.., scheme," they were required to pay
higher tax rates for the same or lesser educational opportunities as
those afforded children of parents in other districts. 20
The relief sought was a declaration of invalidity of the financing
scheme, an order that school funds (including those derived from real
13 Id., Exhibit "D". The Los Angeles County figures were paralleled by those for the
state as a whole. Id., Exhibits "A" & "C."
14 Id. at 12. Specifically mentioned were article I, sections II and 21, of the California
Constitution. Id. at 10. Those sections have been held to be "'substantially the equivalent'" of the equal protection clause. 5 Cal. 3d at 596 n.11, 487 P.2d at 1249 n.1l, 96
Cal. Rptr. at 609 n.11.
Article I, § 11, reads:
All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation.
Article I, § 21, provides:
No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be
altered, revoked or repealed by the Legislature; nor shall any citizen, or class of
citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall
not be granted to all citizens.
15 This cialm was raised, not in the complaint, but in plaintiff-appellants' opening
brief before the California court of appeal. Appellants' Opening Brief at 34-39, Serrano
v. Priest, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345 ( 2d Ct. App. 1970). It was, nevertheless,
considered by the state court of appeal and the state supreme court as if it had been
raised in the complaint.
Article IX, § 5, states:
The Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools by which a free
school shall be kept up and supported in each district at least six months in
every year after the first year in which a school has been established.
16 Local property taxes were found to have accounted for 57.7 percent of California's
school revenues in 1968-69; state aid and federal funds contributed 35.5 and 6.1 percent
respectively of the district budgets. 5 Cal. 3d at 591-92 n.2, 487 P.2d at 1246 n.2, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 606 n.2.
17 Complaint at 12, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 15.
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property taxes) be reallocated so as not to deny California children and
parents equal protection, and a retention of jurisdiction by the trial
court while the legislature and defendants were given time to restruc2

ture the system.

1

The supreme court abruptly dismissed plaintiff's contentions based
on article IX, section 5, of the California Constitution,22 but held that
21 Id. at 16-17.
22 5 Cal. 3d at 595-96, 487 P.2d at 1248-49, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 608-09. The court acknowledged that it had previously held that the section implied
a unity of purpose as well as an entirety of operation, and the direction to the
legislature to provide a system of common schools means one system ....
Id. at 595, 487 P.2d at 1248, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 608, quoting Kennedy v. Miller, 97 Cal. 429,
432, 32 P. 558, 559 (1893) (emphasis in original).
Nevertheless, it stated,
[We have never interpreted the constitutional provision to require equal school
spending; we have ruled only that the educational system must be uniform in
terms of the prescribed course of study and educational progression from grade
to grade.
Id. at 596, 487 P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
In the California constitutional scheme, the declaration of state responsibility is followed by another section on school finance which was also held by the court to preclude
the attack, since it "specifically authorizes the very element of the fiscal system of which
plaintiffs complain." Id., 487 P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
CAr.. CowsT. art. IX, § 6, reads in pertinent part:
The legislature shall provide for the levying annually by the governing body of
each county, and city and county, of such school district taxes ... as will produce
in each fiscal year such revenue for each school district as the governing board
thereof shall determine is required ....
Even if article IX, sections 5 and 6, are wholly inconsistent, said the Serrano court,
section 6 must prevail because it is the more specific provision and was adopted more
recently. Answering the identical points made by defendants to the Court of Appeal
(Respondents' Brief at 66-70, Serrano v. Priest, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345
(2d Ct. App. 1970)), plaintiffs had argued:
[T]he disparities in revenue . . . are so substantial . . . that the student attending school in a poor district receives an education which does not equip him to
move from one grade to another . . . . Rather he is subjected to a separate,
distinct, and markedly inferior school system. The result of the current school
financing scheme is the creation of a series of school districts providing various
kinds of education with only the veneer of uniformity.
Appellants' Petition for Rehearing at 10, Serrano v. Priest, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89
Cal. Rptr. 345 (2d Ct. App. 1970).
It seems legitimate to ask why the court so readily adopted the defendants' point of
view in face of plaintiffs' assertion that the financing method "produces separate and
distinct systems." 5 Cal. 3d at 595, 487 P.2d at 1248, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 608. Using the
opinion's own statement that "[e]lementary principles of construction dictate that where
constitutional provisions can reasonably be construed to avoid a conflict, such an interpretation should be adopted," (Id. at 596, 487 P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609) could
not section 6 have been read as fitting within the framework established by, and therefore limited by section 5? Such a construction would not have necessarily required "equal
spending" but would have prohibited substantial disparities. Certainly, the language of
section 6, "such revenue . . . as the governing board . . . shall determine is required,"
(emphasis added) does not indicate that school boards are to have unlimited discretion.
The court was apparently so well disposed toward the equal protection argument that
it overlooked the California constitutional possibilities. This is perhaps an unfair statement, however, since article I, section 5, remained in the background of plaintiffs' case
throughout. See note 15 supra and note 50 infra. The reconciliation of sections 5 and 6
suggestcd above was never proposed.
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a cause of action was stated under the equal protection provisions of the
fourteenth amendment and California's article I, sections 11 and 21.
This controversial holding was so widely misconstrued as immediately
invalidating the statutory finance scheme and the use of the local property tax to support public schools 23 that the court subsequently issued
a modification of the original opinion.2 4 The modification can be of

small comfort to California legislators, however, since the opinion took
judicial notice of so many government-reported facts about the structure and effects of the funding plan,25 that a declaration of unconstitutionality by the Los Angeles County Superior Court seems inevitable.
Justice Sullivan's equal protection analysis 26 for the majority was
grounded on the premise that the United States Supreme Court has
established two distinct tests of the validity of legislation under the
equal protection clause. The traditional test of the rationality of the
relationship between classification and ends sought to be achieved is
applicable when economic regulations are challenged; a different standard involving close judicial scrutiny is employed when a classification
is itself "invidious" or "suspect" or when the interest affected by it
is deemed "fundamental." When the latter test is used, only a "com27
pelling state interest" can justify the classification.
23 E.g., NEWSWEEK, Sept. 13, 1971, at 61; TIME, Sept. 13, 1971, at 47; N.Y. Times,
Sept. 19, 1971, at 45, col. 1; id., Sept. 2, 1971, at 32, col. 1 and 55, col. 2; id., Aug. 31,
1971, at 23, col. 2.
24 Serrano v. Priest, Modification of Opinion, L.A. No. 29820 (filed Oct. 21, 1971).
The modification stressed that the earlier decision was "not a final judgment on the
merits." Id. at 1. And that, if the trial court should declare the present system of school
finance unconstitutional, relief should be purely prospective:
Obviously, any judgment invalidating the existing system of public school financing should make clear that the existing system is to remain operable until an
appropriate new system, which is not violative of equal protection of the laws,
can be put into effect.
Id. at 2.
255 Cal. 3d at 591-95, 487 P.2d at 1245-48, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 605-08.
26 The entire analysis was couched in terms of the content of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment but the court held the discussion equally applicable
to plaintiffs' claims under article I, sections 11 and 21, of the California Constitution. Id.
at 596 n.1l, 487 P.2d at 1249 n.11, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609 n.ll. See note 14 supra.
27 Id. at 597, 487 P.2d at 1249-50, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609-10, citing the California Supreme Court's own exposition of the two-level test in Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d
765, 784-85, 471 P.2d 487, 500, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839, 852, vacated on other grounds, 403 U.S.
922 (1971). The existence of a two-level test probably first gained notice when Mr. Justice
Stone, speaking for the Court in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938),
a case involving economic regulation, stated in a footnote:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
constitution ....
. [L]egislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily
be expected to bring about the repeal of undesirable legislation . . . [may be
subjected to] more exacting judicial scrutiny . ...
• . . [Pjrejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condi-
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Wealth, said the Serrano majority, has been repeatedly established
by the Supreme Court as a "suspect classification" for equal protection
purposes. 28 Plaintiffs' contention that the school financing scheme classified (and thus apportioned educational quality) on the basis of wealth,
was found "irrefutable."2 9
Moreover, education was held to be a fundamental interest. 30 In
tion, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry ....
Id. at 152-53 n.4 (citations omitted).
The possibilities of the doctrine were explored in a classic article on equal protection. Tussman 8:tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 38 CALuF. L. REV. 341,
353-81 (1949).
285 Cal. 3d at 597-603, 487 P2d at 1250-55, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610-15, quoting Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) and McDonald v. Board of Elections,
594 U.S. 802, 807 (1969). The quoted cases equated lines drawn on the basis of wealth
with racial distinctions and labelled both "highly suspect" when they endanger access to
the vote. A second line of cases cited as authority for the proposition that wealth is a
suspect classification was the Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right of indigent criminal defendant to free transcript on appeal)-Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(right of indigent to court-appointed counsel on appeal) series.
295 Cal. 3d at 598, 604, 614, 487 P.2d at 250, 1255, 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610, 615,
623. Plaintiffs had charged the existence of classification based on two types of wealth:
district wealth and the personal wealth of residents of the various districts. See text
accompanying notes 18 and 19 supra. For purposes of the hearing on demurrer, the
alleged correlations between district wealth (assessed valuation per pupil) and individual
wealth were deemed admitted. Id. at 601, 487 P.2d at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615. This
is one of two evidentiary issues that remain to be settled on remand. See note 85 infra.
Even if resolved adverse to the plaintiffs, however, it will apparently not affect the outcome, because the California supreme court majority declared discrimination on the
basis of district wealth "equally invalid" as that on the basis of individual wealth. Id. at
601, 487 P.2d at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612. Although the correlation might be questionable where commercial and industrial property significantly enhanced a district's tax
base,
[t]o allot more educational dollars to the children of one district than to those
of another merely because of the fortuitous presence of such property is to make
the quality of a child's education dependent upon the location of private commercial and industrial establishments. Surely, this is to rely on the most irrelevant
of factors as the basis for educational financing.
Id., 487 P.2d at 1252-53, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612-13.
The link between district wealth, individual wealth and expenditures per pupil has
since been firmly established by an affidavit filed October 1, 1971 in support of a claim
similar to Serrano. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., Civil Action No.
68-175-SA (W.D. Tex., filed July 30, 1968). See note 163 infra.

30 5 Cal. 3d at 604-10, 487 P.2d at 1255-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615-19. Although the

specific issue in Serrano--whether education is a fundamental interest that cannot be
conditioned on wealth-was admittedly "not supported by any direct authority" (id. at
604, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615), the court relied upon an abundance of dicta
in its own and United States Supreme Court opinions.
The most often-cited enshrinement of education appeared in Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954):
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
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reaching this determination, the court was most swayed by the following characteristics of education:
1) it "is essential in maintaining what several commentators have
termed 'free enterprise democracy'-that is, preserving an individual's
opportunity to compete successfully in the economic marketplace, de31
spite a disadvantaged background;"
2) it "is universally relevant" in contrast to other services such as
32
police and fire protection;
3) it "continues over a lengthy period of life ....
[flew other
government services have such sustained, intensive contact with the
recipient." 33
4) it "is unmatched in the extent to which it molds the personality
' 34
of the youth of society.
5) it "is so important that the state has made it compulsory-not
only in the requirement of attendance but also by assignment to a particular district and school. Although a child of wealthy parents has the
opportunity to attend a private school, this freedom is seldom avail3
able to the indigent. 5
In combination, 36 the two factors of classification by wealth and
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken
to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
The Brown dictum is phrased so forcefully that it might almost be considered decisive on the educational finance issue except for the fact that the overriding concern of
the case was clearly racial discrimination. This has been shown conclusively by the postBrown segregation cases. Serrano defendants were thus able to argue; "iT]he racial cases
do not suggest a constitutional difference [between] motor buses, golf, swimming and
education." Respondents' Brief at 53, Serrano v. Priest, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 345 (2d Ct. App. 1970). It would be fairer to say that Brown certainly suggests (very
persuasively) a constitutional difference; it simply does not dictate it.
A recent United States Supreme Court opinion, cited by the Serrano majority, supports this latter view. In upholding the right of a municipality to shut down its public
swimming pools rather than integrate them, the Supreme Court found it necessary to
distinguish a school closing case, Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 187 F. Supp. 42
(E.D. La. 1960), aff'd, 365 U.S. 569 (1961). It did so by stating,
[Olf course that case did not involve swimming pools but rather public schools,
an enterprise we have described as "perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments."
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 221 n.6, quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
315 Cal. 3d at 604, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618-619.
32 Id., 487 P.2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 609-10, 487 P.2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
35 Id. at 610, 487 P.2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
36 It was acknowledged that wealth classifications have never been invalidated independent of a limited set of fundamental interests, i.e., the voting interest and the interest
in fair criminal process. 5 Cal. 3d at 604, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
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fundamental interest demanded, for justification of the uneven apportionment, a compelling state interest unachievable by another
37
means.
Defendants insisted throughout the litigation that the legislative
38
plan should be measured against the "rational relationship" standard.
The locally collected and retained property tax, and thus the interdistrict spending variations, were, they argued, reasonably related to
California's policy "to strengthen and encourage local responsibility for
control of public education." 39 In the court of appeal, they had declared:
Despite their protestations to the contrary, the actual achievement
of appellants' goals requires the abandonment of our tradition of
local control of public education and the local property tax as the
main source of financing our public schools.40
Justice Sullivan's opinion countered by pointing out that "local
control" was divisible into the area of administrative control and fiscal
choice. Even if local administrative control were assumed to be a compelling state interest, the Serrano opinion was not intended to affect
it.41 As to the asserted interest in local fiscal control, the state was said
to have relinquished all claim to such a justification, since its policies
actually hampered local choice for poorer districts:
[U]nder the present financing system, such fiscal freewill is a cruel
illusion for the poor school districts....
. ..[S]o long as the assessed valuation within a district's boundaries
is a determinant of how much it can spend for its schools, only a
district with a large tax base will be truly able to decide how much
it really cares about education. The poor district cannot freely
choose to tax itself into an excellence which its tax rolls cannot
provide. Far from being necessary to promote local fiscal choice, the
present financing
system actually deprives the less wealthy districts
42
of that option.
37 The

"less onerous alternative" refinement of the "compelling interest" burden

was used in Carrington v. Rash, 280 U.S. 89 (1965), involving the fundamental voting
interest.
38 See, e.g., Respondents' Brief at 14-20, Serrano v. Priest, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89
Cal. Rptr. 345 (2d Ct. App. 1970).
39 5 Cal. 3d at 610, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620, quoting CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 17,300 (Vest 1969).
40Respondents' Brief at 26, Serrano v. Priest, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr.

345 (2d Ct. App. 1970).

41 No matter how the state decides to finance its system of public education, it
can still leave this decision-making power in the hands of local districts.
5 Cal. 3d at 610, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620. Local administrative control is

deemed desirable by commentators who favor a declaration of unconstitutionality of
present financing schemes. Much energy has been devoted to refuting the alleged incom-patibility of local control and equalized educational opportunities. See notes 106-15 and
accompanying text infra.
42

5 Cal. 3d at 611, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620. According to the court's
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There was, then, no compelling state interest present to validate
the "suspect classification" of wealth as it affected the fundamental
interest in educaion.
Defendants' additional contentions that a purposeful or intentional
discrimination must be alleged, that de facto wealth discrimination was
not redressible, as well as the underlying argument that, at most, what
43
was involved was de facto discrimination, were all rejected.
[]e find the case unusual in the extent to which governmental
action is the cause of the wealth classifications. The school funding
scheme is mandated in every detail by the California Constitution
and statutes. Although private residential and commercial patterns
may be partly responsible for the distribution of assessed valuation
throughout the state, such patterns are shaped and hardened by
zoning ordinances and other governmental land-use controls which
promote economic exclusivity.... Governmental action drew the
school district boundary lines, thus determining how much local
wealth each district would contain.... Compared with Griffin and
Douglas ... official activity has played a significant role in44establishing the economic classifications challenged in this action.
Finally, Justice Sullivan dismissed the argument that plaintiffs'
claims had already been resolved adversely by the United States Supreme
Court's summary affirmances of the three-judge federal court opinions
in Mclnnis v. Shapiro45 and Burruss v. Wilkerson,46 two prior challenges
to school financing schemes.
Mclnnis had been the main stumbling block to the Serrano claims
in the lower courts. The Superior Court of Los Angeles cited Mclnnis
in its order of dismissal, 47 and the court of appeals cited it throughout
analysis, the California plan should also be invalid under the "rational relationship"
test. That claim was also raised by the plaintiffs. Complaint at 14, Serrano v. Priest, 5
Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Appellants' Opening Brief at 3,
Serrano v. Priest, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345 (2d Ct. App. 1970). The difficulty with a rational relation test is twofold: it would fly in the face of an express
legislative declaration that "[e]ffective local control requires a local taxing power, and
a local tax base which is not unduly restricted or overburdened." (CAL. EBUC. CODE
§ 17,300 (West 1969); it would also not involve the setting of a standard to ensure equal
educational opportunity.
43 Citing Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956), the court noted that none of the previously invalidated wealth classifications
had involved purposeful discrimination. "[T]hese prior decisions have involved 'unintentional' classifications whose impact fell more heavily on the poor." 5 Cal. 3d at 602, 487
P.2d at 1253-54, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613-14.
44 5 Cal. 3d at 603, 487 P.2d at 1254, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
45 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. I1. 1968), aff'd inem. sub nom Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S.
322 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
46 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd tnem., 397 U.S. 44 (1970) (Douglas & White,
JJ., dissenting). Burruss was affirmed on the basis of McInnis.
47 10 Cal. App. 3d at 1114 n.7, 89 Cal. Rptr. n.7.
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its affirmance, 48 except where the claim under article IX, section 5, of
the California Constitution was considered.
Conceding that the Mclnnis affirmance was "formally a decision on
the merits," the Serrano court nevertheless felt that the weight of a
summary disposition in the case of a non-discretionary appeal was
uncertain, "especially where, as in Mclnnis, the Court cites no cases as
49
authority and guidance."
In any event, the court agreed with the Serrano plaintiffs that
their contentions differed significantly from those raised in Mclnnis.

The Mclnnis Court was primarily disturbed by the non-justiciability of
the plaintiffs' claim that resources must be allocated according to "educational needs." 50 The Supreme Court's summary affirmance was
therefore held not dispositive of the issues in Serrano.

In stating its conclusions, the California court made it quite plain
that a constitutionally acceptable financing system could not tie the

quality of a child's education to the wealth of his parents, neighbors
48 Id. at 1114-17, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 348-50. Justice McComb's dissent to the California
Supreme Court result was therefore also based on Mclnnis because he simply cited the
court of appeal opinion. 5 Cal. 3d at 619, 487 P.2d at 1266, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 626 (McComb,
J., dissenting).
49 5 Cal. 3d at 616, 487 P.2d at 1264, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
GOId. at 617, 487 P.2d at 1264-65, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624-25. It is not true that no
"needs" standard was asserted in Serrano or that
[t]he instant complaint employs a familiar standard which has guided decisions
of both the United States and California Supreme Courts: discrimination on
the basis of wealth is an inherently suspect classification which may be justified
only on the basis of a compelling state interest.
Id., 487 P.2d at 1264, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624 (emphasis added). The fact is that the Serrano
complaint contained an allegation similar to that offered in Mclnnis:
The financing, scheme ... fails to meet the minimum requirements of the equal
protection clause . . . [in that it) . .. [flails to take account of any of the
variety of educational needs of the several school districts (and of the children
therein) of the State of California ....
Complaint at 12, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
Of course, discrimination on the basis of wealth was also charged but, in the complaint,
the challenge was phrased purely in terms of the traditional rational relation test. Complaint at 14, id.
The explanation of the discrepancies is that the character of the Serrano suit changed
radically from the trial court to the Court of Appeal. The "needs" standard was never
mentioned again and the "suspect classification"--"fundamental interest" rationale, ignored in the complaint, was made central to the cause of action. See Appellants' Opening
Brief at 15-29, Serrano v. Priest, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345 (2d Ct. App.
1970); Petition for Hearing in the Supreme Court, at 16-22, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d
584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1971).
The pronounced shift in rationale and the adoption of a manageable "no-wealth
standard" (the complaint was more nebulously styled a "suit to secure equality of
educational opportunity" and the relief it asked for a restructuring of the finance system
to provide "substantially equal educational opportunities') may be attributed to two
events. The first was the affirmance of Mclnnis by the Supreme Court subsequent to the
trial court's dismissal of Serrano. The second was the appearance of what has become
the definitive outline of school financing systems and a constitutional route to their
restructuring. Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitu-
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or area of residence. 51 If did not clarify whether some additional element might be required to meet the demands of equal protection,5 2 and
was noticeably wary of giving any indication of what effect the ruling
might have on inter-locality disparities in the provision of other services such as police and sanitation. Defendants had argued:
[I]f the equal protection clause commands that the relative wealth
of school districts may not determine the quality of public education, it must be deemed to direct the same command to all government entities in respect to all tax-supported public services; and
such a principle would spell the destruction of local government. 53
tional Test for State FinancialStructures, 57 CALI. L. REV. 305 (1969) [hereinafter Coons].
The article was amplified in

J.

CooNs, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND

PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970) [hereinafter PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION]. The impact
of the work of these three authors on the course of the Serrano litigation and its outcome is readily apparent: their analysis of the relevant case law is essentially what appears
in the Serrano opinion.
The Mclnnis outcome had another noteworthy effect on the California suit. Plaintiffs
tacked a California constitutional claim under article IX, section 5, onto their original
equal protection claim. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 34-39, Petition for Rehearing at
10, Serrano v. Priest, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345 (2d Ct. App. 1970); Petition
for Hearing in the Supreme Court at 23, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241,
96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). Cf. Complaint, id.
515 Cal. 5d at 614-15, 617, 487 P.2d at 1263-64, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 623-24. This is a
rephrasing of the standard proposed by Coons, Clune and Sugarman (and denominated
by them "Proposition I"): "The quality of public education may not be a function of
wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole." Coons, supra note 50, at 311, 340;
PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 50, at 304. The standard proposed by
Coons et al. was even more explicitly adopted (and its source acknowledged) in the recent
case of Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, No. 3-71 Civ. 243 (D. Minn., decided Oct. 12, 1971).
Plainly put, the rule is that the level of spending for a child's education may
not be a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole.
Id. at 2. [All citations hereinafter to Van Dusartz v. Hatfield will be made with reference
to the pagination of the memorandum and order as filed in the district court on October
12, 1971].
This reenforces the view that the no-wealth (or, as Van Dusartz labelled it, "fiscal
neutrality") principle was the constitutional standard adopted in Serrano, because Van
Dusartz cited Serrano as direct authority. Since the standard is that articulated by Coons,
Clune and Sugarman, it is appropriate to inquire how they define quality. In Private
Wealth and Public Education, they state:
[Q]uality . . . is . . . what is available . . . whatever goods and services are pur-

chased by school districts to perform their task of education. Quality is the sum of
district expenditures per pupil; quality is money.
Id. 25 (emphasis added).
52 The thought that perhaps more is involved than the no-wealth principle is inspired
by the following language:
Plaintiff children have alleged facts showing that the public school financing
system denies them equal protection of the laws because it produces substantial
disparities... in the amount of revenue available for education.
5 Cal. 3d at 618, 487 P.2d at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625 (emphasis added). A requirement
of substantial equality in revenues available per student is quite a different thing from a
no-wealth standard. The latter would permit quality to be a function of factors other
than wealth, e.g., disadvantage, ability (factors personal to the child) or non-personal,
non-wealth factors such as district or family revenue-raising effort. See notes 109-15 and
accompanying text infra.
53 Id. at 613-14, 487 P.2d at 1262, 90 Cal, Rptr. at 622 (footnote omitted).
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54
Defendants' alarm tactics were "unhesitatingly .reject[ed]," but
in a manner that clearly55 left the door open to future resolution of the
substantive contention.
To homeowners weary of the ever-increasing demands of school
budgets reflected in skyrocketing property taxes, the Serrano opinion
is of little direct benefit. It by no means invalidated the property tax
as a means of financing education nor did it state that property tax rates
must be equal throughout the state.
The resolution of the Serrano parents' cause of action is unclear,
probably because it was entirely subordinate to that stated by the
children. The Serrano parents attacked the high tax rates in their lowwealth districts only because of the inequities in educational opportunities experienced by their children. 6
The ecstasy undoubtedly felt by California property owners as a
result of the original opinion's careless intimation that taxpayers in low
wealth districts might refuse to cooperate with the system, i.e., withhold
their taxes, 5 7 was quickly dampened by the modified opinion.
Of all the questions left unanswered by Serrano, the most intrigu-

54 Id. at 614, 487 P.2d at 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
G5 Although we intimate no views on other governmental services [emphasis
added] we are satisfied that, as we have explained, its uniqueness among public
activities dearly demonstrates that education [emphasis in original] must respond to the command of the equal protection clause.
Id., 487 P.2d at 1262-63, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 622-23. The federal district court in Van Dusartz
was considerably more negative on the issue. Education, it said, is to be "sharply dis-

tinguished" from other governmental services and the decision in the instant case is
"not ...an opening wedge for eventual fiscal neutrality in all government service ...."
Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, memorandum and order at 7 n.8, No. 3-71 Civ. 243 (D.Minn.,

decided Oct. 12, 1971). The commentators, at least for purposes of pressing the educational equality arguments, are in agreement with the latter view. PRIVATE WEALTH AND
PUBLIC EDUCATION, 414-19; Silard & White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public Education:
The Case for Judicial Relief Under the Equal Protection Clause, 1970 WIs. L. REV.. 7,
24-25 [hereinafter Silard].
ti See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
57 Plaintiff parents join with plaintiff children in the prayer of the complaint
... that defendants be required to restructure the present financial system ....
Such prayed for relief is strictly injunctive and seeks to prevent public officers
of a county from acting under an allegedly void law. Plaintiff parents then
clearly have stated a cause of action since [i]f the . . . law is unconstitutional,
then county officials may be enjoined from spending their time carrying out its
provisions ....
5 Cal. 3d at 618, 487 P.2d at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625, quoting Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal.
3d 258, 269, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
A suit commenced in New York subsequent to the decision in Serrano promises to
delineate the denial of equal protection because of uneven taxing argument. The gravamen of the complaint in Spano v. Lakeland School Dist. No. 1, No. 10510 (Sup. Ct.,
Westchester County, filed Sept. 15, 1971) is that the present New York school financing
system "[u]nconstitutionally discriminates against the Plaintiff in that he is taxed more
heavily in order to provide education in his school district." Complaint at 4, id.
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ing, because most inscrutable, is the acceptability of the California
court's rationale to the United States Supreme Court. 5
Concern over the decision's anticipated impact will also be generated in the following interrelated areas: overall quality and continued
viability of public school systems, public and legislative response, local
choice in educational programming and financing educational opportunities for minorities, housing distribution, and interstate disparities
in educational quality. A consideration of the options and probabilities
in some of these areas follows.
BACKGROUND AND FUTURE OF

EQUAL

EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

Three factors seem most strongly present in the background of the
Serrano opinion and of the extensive legal writing that has long advocated such a result: 59 a widespread conviction among those who have
studied present school financing systems as to their educational undesirability and the need for reform;6 0 the peculiar injustices of the local
58 It does not appear likely that Serrano itself will reach the Supreme Court since
there has been no application for a writ of certiorari and one of the principal defendants, California's State Superintendent of Public Instruction, has announced that he
would be positively opposed to a review of the decision. N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1971, at
23, col. 3.
Serrano'srationale has already been adopted by another' court, however. Van Dusartz
v. Hatfield, No. 3-71 Civ. 243 (D. Minn., decided Oct. 12, 1971). It will undoubtedly
influence the outcome in educational finance cases that were already pending. E.g.,
Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., Civil Action No. 68-175-SA (W.D.
Tex., filed July 30, 1968) (request for three-judge court denied at 299 F. Supp 476 (W.D.
Tex. 1969) because of failure to join proper party state officials with local administrators
of finance scheme). Additionally, Serrano has sparked new litigation, e.g., Milliken v.
Green, No. 13664-C (Cir. Ct. Ingham County, Mich., filed Oct. 15, 1971) (equal protection
suit by Governor and Attorney General of Michigan against State Treasurer and three
wealthy school districts); Spano v. Board of Educ., Lakeland Central School Dist. No. 1,
No. 10510 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County, N.Y., filed Sept. 15, 1971).
A conference for attorneys interested in instituting Serrano-type litigation was held
October 16, 1971 in Washington, D.C. under the sponsorship of the Lawyers Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law. A detailed model complaint was distributed to those attending. It seems, inevitable, therefore, that the Serrano reasoning will be considered by
the Supreme Court.
59 See, e.g., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION; WISE, supra note 2; Silard, supra
note 55; Coons, supra note 50; Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term Foreword:
On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969)
[hereinafter Michelman]; Horowitz & Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities
in Public Education and Public Assistance Programs From Place to Place Within A State,
15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 787 (1968) [hereinafter Horowitz]. Some of the authors have assumed
a very active role: Professor Horowitz served as attorney for the Serrano plaintiffs, Professor Coons as counsel to the Van Dusartz complainants.
60 See generally Status and Impact of Educational Finance Programs, 4 NATIONAL
EDUCATIONAL FINANCE PROJECr (R. Johns et al. ed. 1971); PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC
EDUCATION; REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADvIsoRY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 434-36
(Bantam ed. 1968); F. KEPPEL, THE NECCESsARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN EDUCATION (1966);
C. BENSON, THE CHEERFUL PROSPECT: A STATEMENT ON THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
(1965); J. CONANT, SLUMS AND SUBURBS (1961).
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property tax-based systems as to both parent and child; 61 and an expansionist concept of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
62
dause.
A. PreliminaryDiscussion
State support ("subvention") of school district budgets ranges from
10 to 80 percent 63 of total revenues in all states except Hawaii, 64 with
the average level of support at 41 percent. 65 Few states are at the extremes. 6 Subvention or "equalization" aids take three basic forms:
"flat grant," "foundation plan" and "percentage equalizing" plans.
A flat grant, as the name implies, is a legislatively stipulated amount
allocated usually on a per pupil basis without regard to special needs,
local revenue raising ability or cost differentials from district to district.67 Seven states use this model or a refinement of it in which cost
differentials are taken into account.6
Foundation plans involve the setting of a foundation program
(determination of the amount to be spent in elementary, intermediate
and high schools). A district taxing its property owners at a specified
minimum rate will receive in state aid the difference between the
amount to be produced locally by taxation at the minimum rate and
61 See notes 79-81 and accompanying text infra.
62 The use of the term "expansionist" may be somewhat deceptive. In relation to
the Serrano opinion and the views of most commentators mentioned in note 59, supra,
it means a confidence in the flexibility of categories or guidelines already established by
the United States Supreme Court. For some, however, it may have greater significance,
as in the following conclusion about the judicial reasoning behind Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 569 (1967):
History- not the "original understanding," but tomorrow's history- will validate the decision as no satisfying doctrinal discourse could . . . . No one - not
even professional writers about the court - would have been impressed by the
statement, "This is a bad law, but we are saying only that it is not unconstitutional": Thus judicial activism feeds on itself. The public has come to expect
the Court to intervene against gross abuses. And so the Court must intervene.
Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection,
1967 Su'. Cr. REV. 59, 79.
From either point of view, the expansionist concept appears to be based on a practical assessment of indicia of what the Supreme Court may be prepared to do in the
area of equal protection. In light of some recent developments, the continuing validity
of the assumption is questionable. See notes 149-53 and accompanying text infra.
03 Coons at 312 n.20, citing A. MURSE, STATE PROGRAMS FoR PUBLIC SCHOOL SUPPORT
(U.S. Office of Education 1965).
04 See note 3 supra.
05 N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1971, at 17, col. 1.
GO
New Hampshire's state aid constitutes only 10 per cent of its school budgets; Delaware and North Carolina are at the other end of the scale. Coons at 312 n.20, citing A.
MURSE, STATE PROGRAMS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL SUPPORT, supra note 63.
67See Status and Impact of Educational Finance Programs, 4 NEFP 121 (R. Johns
et al. ed. 1971); PaIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 52-61; Coons at 313-14.
084 NEFP 121-22. The states are Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, New
Mexico, North Carolina and South Carolina. Id.
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the foundation program. A district taxing itself above the minimum
rate will not have the added revenue deducted from its state allocation.6 9 By far the greatest number of states-34-employ foundation
plans as their basic subvention approach.70
Percentage equalizing plans theoretically allow a district to set its
own budget and receive state aid in inverse proportion to its revenueraising ability (computed by comparison to the average ability level
of districts in the state)." 1 Six states purport to use this plan,72 but it has
been pointed out that "no system in existence resembles the theory. '73
Some of the shortcomings of one percentage equalizing scheme-New
York's-will be considered in detail later."4
The models are employed in combination as well. One combination that has been severely attacked is that of foundation plan and flat
grant, in which the flat grant is added to the amount to be raised locally
and both are deducted from the foundation program in order to compute the amount of equalization aid to be received. California, Illinois
and Minnesota are among the states using such a combination. 5 The
Serrano and Van Dusartz courts both noted the peculiar inequities of
the flat grant in such a context: it is of no benefit to poor districts since,
without it, they would have to be given the same total amount in
equalization aid to bring their revenue up to the foundation level. In
fact, it aids only the rich districts, since they would be ineligible for
any state aid if only a foundation plan were used. 6 "[B]asic aid [the
California flat grant program], which constitutes about half of the state
educationl funds . . .actually widens the gap between rich and poor
districts," the Serrano majority declared."7
But, whatever their form, all state equalization programs have been
found unable to achieve any thing near equalization. It can be mathematically seen, for example, that foundation programs, once the hypothetical tax level is passed, cannot compensate for differences in tax
69 See 4 NEFP 122-23; PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 63-95; Coons at 314-15.
70 4 NEFP 122.
71 See 4 NEFP 128; PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 163-97; Coons at 316.
72 4 NEFP 122. They are Iowa, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island
and Vermont. Id.
73 Coons at 316.
74 See notes 177-92 and accompanying text infra.
75 CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 17651-80, 17751, 17801, 17901, 17902, 17904 (West 1969); 1967
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124.211 (recently expired but treated by Van
Dusartz court as if still in existence). Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, memorandum and order
at 3,No. 3-71 Civ. 243 (D. Minn., decided Oct. 12, 1971)).
76Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, memorandum and order at 4, No. 8-71 Civ. 243 (D. Minn.,
decided Oct. 12, 1971); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d at 594-95, 487 P.2d at 1248, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 608.
77 5 Cal. 3d at 594, 487 P.2d at 1248, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 608 (emphasis added).
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base per pupil. The foundation program guaranteed amount is itself
a minimum (e.g., $355 per elementary pupil in California), s so districts must tax themselves above the hypothetical level. Yet, beyond
that minimum, the increased efforts of poor districts, as measured by
tax rates, produce only minor increments in revenue. Rich districts,
on the other hand, can maximize revenues with little tax effort.
It has, in fact, been demonstrated that low-wealth districts consistently tax themselves for education at higher rates than do rich districts. 7 Yet, statistics also prove that gross inter-district disparities in
expenditures per pupil are a nationwide phenomenon. In 1959-60, 25
states had expenditure differentials (between high and low spending
districts) of over two to one, including four where the ratio was over
three to one.80 Seventeen states had expenditure disparities of over 4
to one, including seven with ratios in excess of 6 to 1.81
The phenomenon is by no means a city-suburban one: 2 because
of special tax bases such as shopping centers, industry, etc., the kind
of educational offering in neighboring suburban communities is just as
likely to differ. 83
It is apparent, then, that, regardless of their labels, nearly all of
the present school financing arrangements are susceptible to Serranotype attack. In light of the data that has been accumulated, the characterization, by United States Commissioner of Education, Sidney P.
78 Id. at 593, 487 P.2d at 1246, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
70 The results of a two-year study of Texas school finances were recently summarized
by Joel S. Berke, director of the Educational Finance and Governance Program of the
Policy Institute, Syracuse University Research Corporation, an organization that has
engaged in extensive educational finance research. The study showed that poorer Texas
districts regularly tax themselves at higher equalized rates and realize lower yields. Affidavit of Joel S. Berke at 3, 10 and Table II at 13, Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent
School Dist., Civil No. 68-175-SA (W.D. Tex., affidavit filed Oct. 1, 1971).
It has also been shown that the ten richest California districts (in terms of assessed
valuation per pupil) all spend more per pupil than the poorest ten while, in all but one
of the richest, tax rates are lower than in all the poorest ten. Brief for Stephen D. Sugarman, The Urban Coalition, The National Committee for the Support of the Public
Schools and John E. Coons as amici curiae at 10-11 ("Exhibit I'), Serrano v. Priest, 5
Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). See also McInnis v. Shapiro, 293
F. Supp. 327, 331 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd mem. sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322
(1969); Silard at 9; Coons at 317.
80 WisE 124-25 (source: F. HARRIsON & E. MCLOONE, PROFILES IN SCHOOL SUPPORT: A
DECENNIAL OVavIEw (1965)).
81 Id.
82 As the district court in Mclnnis v. Shapiro seemed to think. 293 F. Supp. 327, 336
n.38. (1968), aff'd mem. sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
83 On suburban Long Island, New York, for example, the town of Manhasset spends
$1,721 on each of its students; the neighboring town of East Meadow, with a property
tax rate that is 33 percent higher, is able to spend only $968. N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1971,
§ 4, at 7, col. 1.
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Marland, of existing equalization plans as "antiquated"'8 4 seems mild
indeed.
Although the relationship between dollars and quality remains
problematical, 5 a correlation is more than reasonable to assume. The
alternative is to believe that millions of tax dollars are being wasted
and that the interest in local fiscal control is totally irrational.
B.

Search for a Standard

Equalization of educational opportunity is the goal of educational
finance theorists and litigants. But, the articulation of that goal in concrete, judicially manageable terms has been a continuing problem.
In his often cited book, Rich Schools Poor Schools: The Promise
of EqualEducational Opportunity,Arthur E. Wise listed nine proposed
definitions of (and constitutional standards for) equal educational opportunity:
1) The "Negative Definition": "Equality of educational opportunity exists when a child's educational opportunity does not depend
upon either his parent's economic circumstances or his location within
the state. '8 6 Wise criticized the definition as of limited utility, since it
"does not specify the conditions for equality; it merely states the conditions of inequality.. . " He felt, however, that it might prove attractive
to the Supreme Court since it "closely resembles the reasoning employed
'8 7
by the Court in the recent voting cases.

2) "Full Opportunity": This definition assumes differences in the
capacity of students to benefit from education and impractically proposes that resources must be expended on every individual until he
88
reaches the point of satiation.

84 N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1971, at 17, col. 1.
85 This is one of the evidentiary issues that remains open in Serrano. 5 Cal. 3d at
601 n.16, 487 P.2d at 1253 n.16, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613 n.16.
One study of high school students found a positive relationship between resources
such as expenditures per pupil, class size, library quality, counseling programs and
achievement test scores. J.Thomas, Talent Development and the National Income, in H.
JAMES, J. THOMAS & H. DYCK, WEALTH, EXPENDITURES AND DECISION-MAKING FOR EDUCATION 101-42 (1963). The leading authority to the contrary is a report done for the United
States Office of Education which determined that, except for teacher variables, resource
inputs had a negligible effect on educational achievement. The primary determinants
of achievement were said to be home environment and the influence of fellow students.
J. COLEMAN et al., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (National Center for Education
Statistics 1966) ("The Coleman Report"). A recent report of the Council for Basic Education apparently affirms the existence of a correlation. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1971, at 1, col.
6.
86 WISE 146.
87 Id. 147 See note 51 and accompanying text supra, notes 106-08 and accompanying
text infra.
88 Id. 148-49.
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3) The "Foundation Definition."8 9
4) "Minimum Attainment": This proposal would set grade achievement levels and allocate resources to children until they reached the
appropriate level. More resources would be directed at those below
norm. 90
5) The "Levelling Definition": Resources would be allocated in
inverse proportion to a student's ability. An instance of this would be
compensatory education for "culturally deprived" children. 91
6) The "Competition Definition": Like "full opportunity," it is
based on the assumption that children differ in capacity to benefit from
instruction but it would allocate more resources to those with greater
92
abilities.
7) The "Equal Dollars per Pupil Definition": This definition proceeds from the judgment that, since a child has no control over his native
93
abilities, to allocate resources on the basis of ability is discriminatory.
Coons, Clune and Sugarman have labelled this concept of equal educational opportunity "'one kid-one buck' levelism" 94 and it has been
almost universally criticized because of its inflexibility and failure to
take into account factors such as cost differences from area to area.9 5
8) The "Maximum Variance-Ratio Definition": This would involve a judicial determination that differences in per pupil expenditures should not exceed a (necessarily rather arbitrary) maximum ratio.

Thus, the ratio of per pupil spending from highest to lowest district
should not exceed 1.2, 1.5 or some similar figure.98
9) The "Classification Definition": Pupils would be categorized
according to abilities, needs or other relevant characteristics. Pupils
within a given category would be treated equally in terms of kind and
cost of programs. The approach can be rephrased "equality for all
within a 'reasonable' classification." 9
Until recently, those attempts to articulate a constitutional standard of equal educational opportunity were discouraged by two
practical considerations that combined to make questionable the en89 149-50. See notes 69 and 70 and accompanying text supra.
00 Id. 151.

D1 Id. 152-53. A constitutional requirement of compensatory education is explored in
Horowitz, supra note 59, at 1166-72. Note, Equality of Education Opportunity: Are "Compensatory Programs" Constitutionally Required?, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 146 (1968).
92 IVISE 153-55.
93 Id. 155-56.
94 Coons at 339.
95 See, e.g., McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 927, 335-36 (N.D. Ill.1968), aff'd mem.
sub nom. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); Silard at 25.
96 WiSE 156-57.
97 Id. 157-58,
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forceability of any judicial mandate of equality. These considerations
may be called the "levelling downward" and "subsidiarity"' ' 8 problems.
There is a very strong fear that equality in public education would
necessarily involve a complete preemption of all budgetary and administrative decision-making power by the state. The interest in a high
degree of local control to permit different types of programming and
experimentation geared to the needs of differing school populations is
one that is common to parents who have long enjoyed it and those
newly discovering the ineffectiveness of extremely large administrative
units. 9
The alleged incompatibility of "subsidiarity" and fiscal equality
has become axiomatic. The Serrano defendants, for example, cited
section 17,300 of California's Education Code. The declaration of
legislative intent states, inter alia:
The system of public school support should be designated to
strengthen and encourage local responsibility for control of public
education.... Local control is best accomplished by the develop-

ment of strong, vigorous, and properly organized local school administrative units ....Effective local control requires that all local
administrative units . .. have such flexibility in their taxing pro-

grams as will readily permit of progress in the improvement of the
educational program. Effective local control requires a local taxing

power, and a local tax base which is not unduly restricted or overburdened.100
At the onset of the 1968 litigation, a leading spokesman for this
point of view expressed the apprehension that the "inexorable" logic
of the case for equality of educational opportunity would lead the
United States Supreme Court to endorse it by "propos[ing] simple
answers for complex problems."'u 0 Before extending its "egalitarian
revolution"' 0 2 into this area, the Court was urged to consider the
conceived as inevitable consequences:
98 "Subsidiarity" is a term coined by Coons, Clune and Sugarman to describe the
"principle that government should ordinarily leave decision-making and administration
to the smallest unit of society competent to handle them." PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC
EDUCATION 14.

99 In the latter category are residents of city school districts where bureaucracy,
central board of education and unsatisfactory schooling have become interchangeably
descriptive. See, e.g., N. LEvINE & R. COHEN, OCEAN-HILL BROWNSVILLE: SCHOOLS IN CRISES
(1969); D. ROGEs, 110 LIVINGSTON STREET (1968); MAYOR'S AnvisORY PANEL ON DECENTRALIZATION OF THE NEv YORK CITY SCHOOLS, RECONNECrION FOR LEARNING: A COMMUNITY
CONTROL SYSTEM FOR N-W YORK CITY (1967) ("The Bundy Report").

100 CAL. EDUC.CODE § 17,300 (West 1969) (emphasis added).
101 Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 583, 588 (1968) [hereinafter Kurland].

102 Kurland, The Supreme Court 1963 Term Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal
in Title To The Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government", 78 HARV. L.
Rxv. 143, 144 (1964).
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Statewide equality is not consistent with local authority; national
equality is not consistent with state power.
.. . It is impossible . . . to leave discretion and choice to local

government and expect a uniformity of treatment among all units
of local government. Either the taxing power or the spending
power, and probably
both, will have to be transferred from local to
103
state control.
Professor Kurland also raised the "levelling downward" problem
as an argument for judicial restraint. This issue, which should not be
minimized even now, is concerned with the equality of education under
an equalizing plan: it is felt that, given the enormous costs of education and the tremendous disparities that exist, such a plan would most
likely not raise all districts within a state to the quality level of the
best and highest-spending district. A far more likely result is that the
best districts would be levelled downward to some point to which it
was feasible to raise the majority of (poorer) districts.
The combined effect of the two problems could lead to a political
explosion among those who now enjoy high quality education and the
tax backlash might well make an educational-equality victory meaningless. Professor Kurland suggested that the rich might withdraw their
children from the public schools:
[I]t could be argued that by putting everyone in the same boat, we
force the influential members of our society to see the improvement
of their lot by improving the lot of all. The difficulty with this argument is ... that for the affluent, there is, as yet, no obligation to
remain in the same boat .... 104
The two problems were felt quite strongly by the three-judge district court deciding Mclnnis v. Shapiro:
Plaintiffs have assumed that requiring expenditures to be related to

the needs of the students will result in better education for deprived students without a corresponding decrease in the quality of
education now offered by the affluent districts. The more money the
latter districts must supply to the former, however, the less incentive the well-to-do will have to raise their tax rates. If the quality of

good public schools declines, affluent children have the option to
attend private schools, thus completely eliminating the need for the
wealthy to raise taxes. 105
103 Kurland at 590.

104 Id. at 591.
105 McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 336 (N.D. Ill. 1968), afJ'd mern. sub nom.
McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969) (emphasis added). The McInnis court was apparently influenced by Professor Kurland's apprehensions. Id. at 334 n.27, 336 n.35.
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PropositionI
The proponents of equality in public education achieved their
most significant pre-Serrano breakthrough when Professor Coons and
Messrs. Clune and Sugarman set forth their no-wealth constitutional
standard and ingeniously demonstrated that, far from being incompatible with "subsidiarity," it could be used to achieve a greater
degree of meaningful local control.
Their standard, adopted by the Serrano and Van Dusartz courts,
stipulates: "the quality of public education may not be a function of
wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole."' 0 6 Remarkably
07
it
similar to that referred to by Wise as "the negative definition,"'
is, as Professor Kurland feared, a "simple answer," yet it is founded
on a thoughtful analysis of a whole range of complexities. As its
authors have pointed out, it is flexible, recognizing a great deal of
legislative discretion in the fashioning of new, acceptable finance systems. It thus eliminates judicial concern with the possibility of preempting a legislative function. It does not, for example, "require flat
equality or have anything to say upon the issue of compensatory education;"'u0 it would, however, permit either approach.
Proposition I is a simple and enforceable standard; its command is
easily comprehended and it does not require a straining of judicial
ingenuity to determine when and whether individual educational needs
are being met.
Perhaps most important, from the point of view of achieving a
consensus for equal educational opportunity, Proposition I would permit quality differences based on local or family choice provided they
were not also tied to local or family wealth. Of the finance system
models that would accord with Proposition I, Professor Coons and
Messrs. Clune and Sugarman favor a concept known as "power equalizing," which may be employed at either the school district or family
level. "Power equalizing" is intended to create decentralized systems
that eliminate the effects of variations in wealth while promoting local
fiscal and administrative control. It would make the quality of education a function of district or family effort (as measured by tax rates)
rather than of wealth.
"District power equalizing" would "make all districts equal in
their power to raise dollars for education."' 10 9 In its simplest form, the
106 See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
107 See notes 86 and 87 and accompanying text supra.
10 Coons at 312.
108 Id. at 819-20.
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state legislature would establish a table of permissible school district tax rates, each rate having a corresponding permissible level of
expenditure per child. A poor district electing to tax itself at a given
rate would be allowed to spend the corresponding amount per pupil
regardless of whether taxation at that rate actually produced the appropriate amount of revenue. On the other hand, richer districts would
be permitted to spend only the amounts corresponding to their elected
tax rates even though the rates chosen produced excess revenues. 110
The Serrano defendants had argued California's interest in local
control in the following terms:
[i]f one district raises a lesser amount per pupil than another district, this is a matter of choice and preference of the individual district, and reflects the individual desire for lower taxes rather than
an expanded educational program, or may reflect a greater interest
within that district in... other services that are supported by local
property taxes .... 111
As a less onerous alternative for effecting the state's interest,
district power equalizing is dearly unassailable. Expenditures per child
are not, under present financing schemes, a true indication of a community's interest in education. Within a district power equalized framework, however, expenditures would be a true indicator, because they
correspond with varying degrees of tax effort.
If "subsidiarity" is really an interest in delegating authority to
the smallest unit of society capable of handling it, 11 2 then an even more

attractive alternative financing scheme is "family power equalizing,"
the other half of the power equalizing concept developed by Coons,
Clune and Sugarman.
Under this variety of voucher plan, a family would select the rate
at which it wished to tax itself for education and would receive scrip
for the tuition amount selected by the legislature to correspond with
that particular level of tax effort. Family income per child is the wealth
against which the family effort would be measured. The legislature
would also decide whether it wanted to limit use of the plan to public
schools, extend it to private schools or opt to fulfill its educational
responsibility completely through private schools. If private schools
were included, the legislature would have the additional responsibility
110 See, Coons at 319-21. Elsewhere the authors discuss the district power equalizing
proposal in greater detail, suggesting adjustments of the basic model to accommodate
particular legislative concerns. PRIVATE WFALTH AND PUBLIc EDUCATION 201-42.
111 Respondents' Brief at 21, Serrano v. Priest, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr.

345 (2d Ct. App. 1970).

112 See note 98 supra.
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of providing safeguards to maintain educational quality and non-discrimination. In order to satisfy the mandate of Proposition I, no powerequalized family would be allowed to supplement its scrip with private
resources nor would participating schools be permitted to accept scrip
3
and other payment from the same family."

Criticism of the failures of public school systems has escalated in
recent years." 4 A voucher system would undoubtedly be welcomed by
many parents and educators who would see it as offering three distinct
benefits: diversity; improvement of the quality of education generally
through competition; and, in a very vital way, restoring the family's
involvement in and responsibility for the educational process." 5
The Trouble With PropositionI
It is no small tribute to the authors of Private Wealth and Public
Education that their standard and their exposition of the constitutional
arguments for equality of educational opportunity have already been
adopted by two courts. Their work also promises to be the foundation
of future litigation in the area.116
One very fundamental problem is, however, presented by Proposition I and, more particularly, by its suggested implementation through
113 PRIvATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 256-68; Coons at 321-22. "Family power
equalizing" thus differs radically from the voucher system proposed by Milton Friedman.
The Friedman model would utilize a flat grant voucher which could be supplemented
freely by parents and used in any school they desired. M. FRIEDMrAN, CAPrrALISM AND
FREEDOM 87-102 (1962); Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in PERsPEcTIVES ON THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 132-42 (C. Benson ed. 1963).
114 See, e.g., C. SILBFRaAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOMr (1970).
115 Voucher plans are not without their problems, of course. For an evaluation of
the five most developed voucher proposals, see Areen, Education Vouchers, 6 HAsv. Csv.
RiGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 466 (1971). The author discusses three fundamental issues that
every voucher plan must consider: ensuring equal educational opportunity id. at 477-91);
use of vouchers for support of religious schools (id. at 492-500); and preserving quality
in education (id. at 500-02). The major premises of voucher systems are summarized:
All such plans proceed from the assumption that, while education is important
enough in our society to justify public financial support ... the traditional view
that schools should also be managed by the state does not necessarily follow. All
voucher plans also accept the premise that there is no one "best" school for all
students . . . . Finally, all voucher plans assume that parents should have the
power to choose which of the different "state-approved" schools is best for their
child.
Id. at 470.
Two of the creators of "power equalizing" have recently drafted a detailed model
voucher act, entitled the "Family Choice in Education Act." Coons 8- Sugarman, Family
Choice in Education:A Model State System for Vouchers, 59 CAiFw. L. REv. 321 (1971). A
system proposed by the Center for the Study of Public Policy has been tentatively approved by the United States Office of Economic Opportunity. Three cities (Alum Rock
(San Jose), Cal.; Gary, Ind.; and Seattle, Wash.) are receiving OEO grants to study the
feasibility of instituting a demonstration project of the CSPP plan. Areen, Education
Vouchers, 6 HARv. Civ. RiGHTs-Civ. LiB. L. RFv. 466, 470 n.16 (1971).
116 The model complaint mentioned in note 58 supra was drafted by Professor Coons.
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power equalizing. Proposition I, because it authorizes power equalizing,
permits the quality of a child's education to be a function of district
voters' interest in and willingness to support education. As to the child,
is this any less a denial of equal protection than a legislative scheme
that permits the quality of education to be a function of the wealth
of his parents, neighbors and district?
Suppose, for example, that a child lives in a school district having
more than an average share of senior citizens, single persons or childless
couples. Though the outcome can by no means be certain, it is certainly conceivable that the voters of such a district would choose to
make a less than maximum (and likely less than average) tax effort
for the support of district schools. Is the child attending public school
in such a district being denied equal protection of the laws? In the
context of a statewide system of public schools, is the interest of one
district's voters any less a constitutional irrelevance than district and
parental wealth or geographical location? If so, must we not conclude,
as the Serrano court did with respect to the accident of wealth, that
the fundamental interest of education cannot be made a function of
that irrelevant and fortuitous circumstance?
In a critique of the wealth-as-suspect-classification theory, one
writer has already taken notice of this flaw in Proposition 1.117 Professor
Michelman notes that it would theoretically permit a district to shut
down its schools entirely,11 8 thus depriving some children of all educational opportunity. Such a result would not have been achieved, he
suggests, if the payment requirements cases had been properly interpreted as hinging on the interest involved rather than on the invidiousness of the wealth classification.
He advocates a "minimum protection" approach to a reading of
the equal protection clause. So far as the poor are concerned, the approach visualizes the role of the fourteenth amendment as protecting
them from the most hazardous fallout of our free enterprise system.
State action would not be a particularly important consideration since,
where "just wants"11 9 are concerned, there would be a positive duty
117 Michelman, supra note 59. See also Silard at 2 9.
118 Michelman at 53. Presumably, in authorizing a district power equalizing scheme,
a legislature would set a minimum level of taxation. The point here is that Proposition
I does not commend that a minimum be set and so does not preclude the possibility of

complete educational deprivation for some children.
119 Whether a particular interest is a "just want" is determined by inquiring
whether a person would insist on the relevant assurances [of fulfillment] assuming that he was (a) deprived of knowledge about whether he personally will
find himself in the relevant predicament, but (b) sufficiently informed about the
organizing principles of the society to be able to appraise (i) the frequency of
the predicament and (ii) the gravity, in such a society, of the particular unfulfilled want.
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to fulfill them. 20 On the other hand, classifications on the basis of
payment (de facto wealth classifications) would never independently
render a statute void.
If education be considered a "just want" (and Professor Michelman obviously does so consider it),12 a minimum protectionist view of

the equal protection clause would not permit it to go unsatisfied.
Professor Michelman's analysis has the virtue of candidly acknowledging the root cause of existing educational inequalities. 22 But, while
he sees family power equalizing as the solution to the school finance
dilemma, 123 he fails to satisfactorily explain why a minimum protectionist approach would be any less content with the foundation plans
that now exist.

1 24

Moreover, Professor Michelman does not see that the "family
power equalizing" authorized by Proposition I also raises some equal
protection questions. While the classification of a child on the basis of
his parents' willingness to sacrifice for education may not appear to be
"invidious,"125 yet, if, as minimum protectionists would have it, we are

to look most strongly to the fundamentality of the interest or want involved, then we would be bound to conclude that a child whose parents
are willing to sacrifice very little for education is also being denied
equal protection.
There is another (and, from its originators' point of view, perhaps
even more damning) objection to Proposition I. Is it, in fact, a wealthfree standard? One has to wonder whether the poor should be considered free to decide how much they care about education in the same
way the rich are free to make such a decision.
It is true that, in the past, poorer districts have shown themselves
willing to make disproportionate sacrifices for education.,2 6 Perhaps
there would be only a few isolated instances of poverty-enforced lack of
choice and perhaps only under a family power equalizing plan, but (a)
can we constitutionally afford to make that assumption, and (b) can we
Michelman at 35. Elsewhere, Professor Michelman has more so simply defined "just wants"
as those "which justice requires shall not go involuntarily unfulfilled." Id. at 30.
1201d. at 11.
12 1
See id. at 47-59.
122 Professor Michelman feels that, in the equal protection aspects of its work, the
Supreme Court should be seen as "a body commendably busy with the critically important
task of charting some island of haven from economic disaster in the ocean of . . . free
enterprise." Id. at 33. Elsewhere he describes the Court's equal protection role as one of
symptom-treating. Id. at 8-11.
123 Id. at 53-57.
124Yet Professor Michelman's whole discussion of the educational finance issue is
based on the supposition that the existing systems are unacceptable. See id. at 47-59.
125 See, e.g., the definition of "invidious" offered by Professor Michelman, id. at 19-20.
126 See note 79 and accompanying text supra.
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be any less alarmed because relatively few children would be deprived?
A Child-Centered Standard
If we are concerned about equality of educational opportunity at
all, it is presumably because a great number of children are presently
being denied their fourteenth amendment right to equal treatment in
the most fundamental area of education. If their parents and school districts are being discriminated against, it is only secondarily, through
the children's deprivation, that the discrimination occurs.
The child must therefore be the focal point in any search for a constitutional standard that would ensure equality of educational opportunity. Proposition I is itself constitutionally suspect precisely because
it focuses on the secondary discrimination and seeks to relieve the
primary denial of equal protection only through relief of the subordinate claim. Proposition I represents a nice compromise, but it is a
satisfactory only in a political sense.
Throughout their works, Professor Coons and Messrs. Clune and
Sugarman have made a convincing argument that an educator's standard of equal educational opportunity-one based on an individual's
abilities and need-goes beyond what a constitutional lawyer would
27
demand.
The most satisfying standard would mandate substantially equal
educational quality in terms of resources (teacher quality, class size,
teaching materials, school (including library) facilities, and ancillary
(including counseling) services) rather than dollars, since costs differ
from place to place. The standard should, however, be flexible enough
to permit some experimentation and the channeling of additional
resources to those with special needs or special abilities. Since the primary objective is equal protection of the child, the standard must not
permit the quality of education to be a function of factors wholly extraneous to the child (such as parental wealth or tax effort of a school
district).
Such a standard would mandate that: Within the public education
system of a state, substantiallyequal resources must be made available to
every child at the same grade level. Deviations from substantialequality
must be justified by reference to educationally relevant characteristics
of the child.
Like Proposition I, the standard has the advantages of simplicity,
flexibility and enforceability. It perhaps lacks some of the readily ap127

If, indeed, the matter is still in doubt after the Supreme Court's affirmance of

Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. IlL. 1968), aff'd mem. sub nom. McInnis v.
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 822 (1969).
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parent political appeal of Proposition I. Although it does not dictate a
completely centralized finance system, it obviously envisions close state
monitoring (so, it should be noted, does Proposition I). The "substantial equality" measure would permit some extra local revenue raising
but, unlike Proposition I, the permissible local effort would be strictly
limited to a kind and quantity that would not affect substantial equality.
The Serrano court stressed that administrative and fiscal control
are not inseparable. 28 Equality of resources does not mean sameness in
programming. Local decision-making should, by all means, be fostered.
It is not unreasonable to suppose that, once the judiciary has acted to
protect the long-neglected fourteenth amendment rights of children,
parents and educators who have a strong interests in policy and administrative decentralization will make those interests known to the legislators charged with formulating constitutionally satisfactory school finance
29
plans.
C.

A Supreme Court Serrano?
If and when a Serrano-type case comes before the United States
Supreme Court, the Court must first determine the effect of its holding
in McInnis v. Shapiro'30 on the issues presented. It will also be called
upon to decide the validity of the Serrano rationale.
Mclnnis v. Shapiro
The three-judge court opinion in Mclnnis v. Shapiro, summarily
affirmed by the Supreme Court, should not be held inapplicable for the
reasons stated by the Serrano court, i.e., because significantly different
contentions were raised by the plaintiffs in the two cases;' 31 it should be
held inapplicable because it is riddled with inconsistencies and factual
misstatements and because the educational finance area was not ripe for
judicial intervention at the time Mclnnis was decided.
The Mclnnis plaintiffs were elementary and high school students
from four Cook County, Illinois, school districts, representing them128 See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
129 The myth of incompatibility of "subsidiarity" and equality in education has
been so long with us that it perhaps requires a few concrete examples to dispel. See,
e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAw §§ 2590-e & 2590-i (McKinney 1970) (delegating policy and administrative control of New York City's pre-kindergarten through junior high school programs
to community school boards while retaining a centralized budgetary process for the entire
city district). Regulations promulgated pursuant to Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. § 241a et seq. (1970)) have mandated a high
degree of local control in Title I programming.
130 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), afJ'd mer. sub nora. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S.

322 (1969).

131 See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
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selves and others similarly situated. Like the Serrano plaintiffs, they
challenged the entire state financing scheme. From the court's opinion,
it is apparent that, although they placed great emphasis on allocation of
resources according to needs,' 32 they did not present that as the only
constitutionally permissible solution.
In fact, they suggested two alternate financing plans:
(1) [ail1 students might receive the same dollar appropriations, or
(2) the state could siphon off all money in excess of $ X per pupil
which was produced by a given tax rate, in effect eliminating variations in local property values while leaving the districts free to
establish their own tax rates.'3
The second suggestion is, of course, district power equalizing. The
fact that it was propossed in Mclnnis was pointedly ignored by the
Serrano plaintiffs as well as by the developers of Proposition I.
Although the Mclnnis plaintiffs apparently did not agree that the
Illinois financing system was void because it utilized the suspect classification of wealth, they did contend that education is a fundamental
interest and statutes affecting it require strict judicial scrutiny:
[U]nder the equal protection clause, the students contend that the
importance of education to the welfare of individuals and the
nation requires the courts to invalidate the legislation if potential,
alternative statutes incorporating the desirable aspects of the
present system
can also achieve substantially equal per pupil ex34
penditures.
In the face of this argument, the Mclnnis court expressly declined
to adopt a strict scrutiny test and utilized the traditional rational relation standard, citing economic regulation cases.135
One commentator has described Mclnnis as a "thoroughly unsatisfying opinion."'. 36 A more precise description would be "confused." Although the court had been offered a number of non-needs alternatives,
itconcluded, for two principal reasons, that no cause of action was
stated:
(1) the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that public school
expenditures be made only on the basis of pupils' educational
needs, and (2) the lack of judicially manageable standards makes
this controversy nonjusticiable. 137
132 293 F. Supp. at 329.
133 Id. at 331-32.
134Id. at 331.

135 Id. at 332.
136 Michelman at 48.
137 293 F. Supp. at 329 (footnote omitted).
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The Serrano court was right in concluding that the nonjusticiability of the "needs" standard was the proclaimed ratio decidendi of McInnis. 38 But one wonders whether, given the availability of alternatives

to that standard, the McInnis court was simply attempting to avoid a
decision altogether.
At one point the court equated the "needs" standard with an equal
dollars per pupil rule and thus was able to reject both because "[e]xpenses are not

.

. .

the exclusive yardstick of a child's educational

needs."' 3 9
The opinion is internally inconsistent throughout. The court
initially found:
Clearly, there are wide variations in the amount of money available
for Illinois' school
districts, both on a per pupil basis and in ab140
solute terms.
Yet, it was later stated:
The students also object to having revenues related to property values, apparently without realizing that the equalization grant effectively tempers variations in assessed value....141
In its factual examination of the Illinois financing plan, the threejudge district court found:
Though districts with lower property valuations usually levy higher
tax rates, there is a limit to the amount of money which they can
raise, especially since they are limited by maximum indebtedness
and tax rates. 142
Later, the court was (incredibly) able to state:
[T]he General Assembly's delegation of authority to school districts appears designed to allow individual localities to determine
their own tax burden according to the importance which they place
upon public schools. 143

These contradictions plus the indications that the court had its eye
too firmly fixed on what it conceived to be the probable public reac138

The Mclnnis court found the needs standard "nebulous." Id. at 329 n.4. The

Serrano plaintiffs also utilized a "needs" standard in their complaint. See note 50 supra.
Among the stranger uses to which Mclnnis's condemnation of a "needs" standard has
been put is the validation of Boston's administration of the National School Lunch Program according to location of facilities rather than needs. The National School Lunch Act
expressly provides for provision of the lunches according to need. Briggs v. Kerrigan, 307
F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1969). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1757-58 (1970).
'39 293 F. Supp. at 335.
140 1d. at 81.
141 Id. at 583(emphasis added).
142 Id. at 531.
143 Id. at 333.
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tion,144 make the Mclnnis opinion thoroughly unconvincing as the final
word on the constitutionality of present finance systems.
If Mclnnis appears confused, then the only appropriate description
of the three-judge federal court decision in Burruss v. Wilkerson 45 is
"obtuse." The dismissal of the attack on Virginia's financing plan was
affirmed summarily by the Supreme Court on the authority of Mclnnis.
The Burruss plaintiffs were children, parents and property owners
of Bath County, Virginia. They charged that the Virginia statutory
scheme denied them equal protection in that it perpetuated substantial
disparities in the "educational opportunities" offered children in dif146
ferent areas of the state.
The Burruss court refused to perceive locally raised funds as part
of a common statewide educational financing scheme (despite the state
constitutional provision). 147 It held that since the amounts distributed
from the state school fund alone were not dispersed so as to arbitrarily
favor one district more than another, there was no denial of equal
148
protection.
Assuming that the Supreme Court concludes that its summary
affirmances of Mclnnis and Burruss do not foreclose consideration of a
Serrano-style suit, two questions remain: Will the Serrano rationale be
found acceptable and, if not, will the Serrano result be achieved notwithstanding? At the outset, it should be stated that the addition of two
new members to the Court makes an already unpredictable outcome
even more so.
The contentions of the California plaintiffs and the California
supreme court opinion rested on the twin pillars of wealth as a suspect
classification and education as a fundamental interest for equal protection purposes. In light of some recent United States Supreme Court
opinions, it is apparent that the majority regards the first pillar as
never having been erected.
The five-judge majority opinion in James v. Valtierra149 rejected
the motion that there is something inherently suspect about a wealth
classification. The Court upheld article XXXIV of the California Constitution, which provides that an affirmative majority vote at a community election is required before any low-rent public housing project
can be undertaken by state officials. Noting that no racial discrimination
See note 105 and accompanying text supra.
149 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), affd nzem., 397 U.S. 44 (1970).
144

Id. at 573.
note 2 supra.
148 310 F. Supp. at 574.
149 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
146

147 See
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was alleged, Justice Black's opinion for the Court stated, "[t]he Article
requires referendum approval for any low-rent public housing project,
not only for projects which will be occupied by a racial minority."'u 0
There could hardly be a plainer instance of wealth classification but, in
the absence of an allegation of racial discrimination, the referendum
measure was held valid.
The point was not lost on the three James dissenters. They protested that "explicit classification on the basis of poverty [is] a suspect
classification which demands exacting judicial scrutiny....
In another recent case, Boddie v. Connecticut,1 52 the Court protected the indigent's access to the divorce courts despite inability to pay
filing fees. Although the case appeared to be a direct descendant of the
Griflin-Douglas line, the majority deliberately adopted a due process
rationale rather than extend its equal protection holdings in the area
of wealth classifications. Here, too, the concurring judges felt that the
opinion was an aberration from the pattern of previous decisions that
53
utilized equal protection analyses.
It seems reasonable to conclude, then, that the first pillar of the
Serrano reasoning is, at best, undependable. As to the second, the Serrano court itself conceded that the theory of education as a fundamental
interest for equal protection purposes was not supported by any direct
authority. Unlike wealth-as-suspect-classification, however, education as
fundamental interest has not been rejected by the Supreme Court.
There is reason to believe that the Court would accept the idea
that education is an interest sufficiently fundamental to require a demonstration of compelling interest when the state undertakes to provide it and fails to do so on an equal basis to all. 154 Although the many
dicta that appear on the subject in various Supreme Court opinions are
not controlling, they are of great persuasive value in that they have appeared over an extended period of years and have enjoyed the wholehearted support of the Court. It is, after all, absolutely impossible to
dispute the central importance of education to both the individual and
society. The "egalitarian revolution" seen emerging in the early sixties
150 Id. at 141 (emphasis added).
151 Id. at 144-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
152 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
153 401 U.S. at 883-85 (Douglas, J., concurring); 401 U.S. at 388 (Brennan, J., concurring).
154 If education were recognized as a fundamental interest, it would join the interest
in voting (Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)); the
interest in interstate travel (Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)); and the interest
in personal liberty (Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956)) in that category.
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was, on the other hand, of relatively recent origin and failed to gain
the unanimous support of the Court's members.
One other question should be asked: Can the interest in education
be buttressed by any other argument when the issue of equality of
educational opportunity is presented to the Supreme Court?
There is another argument that was ignored by the Serrano plaintiffs and court but which presents a most appealing case for close judicial scrutiny of school financing systems-the character of those whose
interests are most directly affected, the nation's school children. The
matter has been considered by a few authors 55 and was discussed in
an amicus brief submitted to the California supreme court. 156
Children are probably the best example of those "discrete and insular minorities"' 5 7 whose interests require strict protection under the
equal protection clause. They are politically helpless and are without
defense against abuse of the majoritarian process. For political purposes, they are not even counted a minority.
Furthermore, parents are not always to be relied upon as satisfactory political surrogates for their children:
[T]he truth is that a very significant number of children do not
have voting parents. This failure to vote is a neglect of their interest that children are helpless to alter. Second, even the parent who
does vote is subject to many influences that conflict with the educational interests of his children.153
The Supreme Court previously has not hesitated to protect those
who are effectively unrepresented in a state's political structure, including interstate carriers' 59 and foreign corporations 160 in addition to
racial and ethnic minorities. Although it is true that, in the school
finance cases, children are not being discriminated against as a class,
nevertheless, the interests being affected are the interests of children
-the great majority of children.
There is reason to believe that the test of validity of legislation
under the equal protection clause involves a balancing of interests. The
155 See, e.g., Michelman at 37-38 n.90; Coons at 389-95.
156 Amid curiae Brief of Stephen D. Sugarman et al. at 24-26 Serrano v. Priest, 5

Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
157 United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
158 Amici Curiae Brief of Stephen D. Sugarman et al. at 25, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.
3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). The last point is graphically illustrated
by the fact that the national approval rate of local bond issues for educational purposes
dropped from 79.6 per cent in 1959 to 43.6 per cent in 1969. N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1971,
at 45, col. 1.
159 South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
100 WHYY Inc. v. Borough of Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117 (1968).
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categories that have evolved-"rational relationship," "suspect classification," "fundamental interest," "strict scrutiny" and "compelling inrest"--can be seen as representing a kind of judicial shorthand that is
applied when certain interests have consistently been found to weigh
or not to weigh very heavily in the balance. 161
There is no reason why the Supreme Court should not frankly
acknowledge an equal protection balancing test since it is compatible
with the case law and would eliminate existing confusion over "special"
categories and different types of standards applied at different times.
If such a view were adopted, the interests of children would almost
certainly be accorded great weight, both in the balance of individual
interests and the balance of societal interests.
CITY SCHOOL FINANCING AND EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
162
[T]he public schools' most acute financial crisis is in the cities.

Among the more obvious predictable effects of the Serrano decision are a re-evaluation of existing school finance systems, with an

emphasis on finding new means of support; 16 3 a probable increase in
the quality of education for poor and minority group students; 16 4 and
161 See Michelman at 30 n.70, 34, 36.
162 McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 336 n.38 (N.D. Ill. 1968) aff'd men. sub non.
McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
163 It has been reported that Connecticut, Maryland and Michigan are already
considering financing alterations in light of Serrano. N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1971, at 43,
col. 1; id., Sept. 2, 1971, at 55, col. 1. New York State's system has been under evaluation
since 1969 by its Commission on the Quality, Cost and Financing of Education. The
panel, which is due to make its legislative recommendations this month, was apparently
spurred to new activity by the Serrano opinion N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1971, at 1, col. 8.
New sources of support will have to be found in order to avoid the "levelling downward" problem (see notes 98-105 and accompanying text supra) and to maintain present
program levels. In this respect the property tax has proven itself inadequate. The income
from real estate taxes increases only one percent a year unless raised legislatively, while
school operating budgets throughout the country generally increase at a rate of 15 to 18
percent a year. Discontent over rising property taxes may lead to greater public acceptance
of the Serrano rationale where it would be presumed to be lacking. See complaint, Spano
v. Lakeland School Dist. No. 1, No. 10510 (Sup. Ct., Westchester County, N.Y., filed Sept.
15, 1971) (where a suburban taxpayer claimed a denial of equal protection in comparing
his tax rate and return -in terms of expenditures per child-with those of neighboring
suburban communities). Legislatures can be expected to look to statewide property taxes,
income, sales and corporate taxes for additional school revenues. See note 196 infra. It has
been estimated that approximately 20 states could finance education entirely from income
and sales taxes if they made as great a use of those taxes as the "heavy user states" now
do. Silard at 30, n.83.
164 The result in Serrano was not based on any racial factors. However, the unfortunate tendency of money to flow inversely to the proportion of minority students in a
school was documented in the case of Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
While that case dealt with intra-district disparities, it has been found that there is a
definite correlation between property values per pupil, expenditures per pupil and
percentage of minority pupils. Affidavit of Joel S. Berke at 4, 6, Rodriguez v. San Antonio
Independent School Dist., Civil Action No. 68-175-SA (W.D. Tex., affidavit filed Oct. 1,
1971).
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a new call for federal aid to bolster state education budgets and eradicate the great disparities in spending that exist from state to state.165
Because the effects are less obvious and their exploration useful
in locating factors that a finance system should consider, the remainder
of this Note will be devoted to examining the impact of Serrano on
city schools.
Preliminarily, it is not at all clear that a Serrano-type mandate
of educational equality would have a salutary effect on the financial
problems that now beset boards of education in the large cities.
As the Serrano opinion itself demonstrated and as commentators
have long advocated, the constitutional standard, if and when promulgated by the United States Supreme Court and, in the meantime, as
promulgated by state and lower federal courts, will be a simple and
flexible one, allowing the greatest possible legislative discretion in the
fashioning of new financial schemes. 66 In all probability the standard
will be a negative one,'167 implying no obligation to proceed in any
particular direction except away from the zone of proscribed systems.
The financing problems of the large cities require precisely the
kind of fine tuning that courts will want to (and, indeed, find it necessary to) avoid in setting the initial broad standards for educational
equality. For this reason, the effect of Serrano on city school systems
is unpredictable.
The constitutional standards that have been suggested, including
mandates of equal educational resources per pupil, fiscal neutrality,
non-discrimination against the poor and even allocation of resources or
dollars according to need,' 68 would still permit legislatures to make
The affidavit, summarizing a two-year study of Texas school finances, also found a
positive correlation between district wealth, individual wealth and expenditures per
pupil. Affidavit at 3-7, 9, id. To the extent that large numbers of poor and minority
children tend to live in large cities, the optimistic outlook might have to be modified
somewhat. See notes 166-93 and accompanying text infra.
10 The Governor of Pennsylvania has proposed that a national education trust fund,
similar to the present highway trust fund, be established. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1971, at
31, col. 2. Calls for increased federal funding, particularly in the general rather than
categorical aid area, have also issued from the National Education Finance Project (id.,
Nov. 3, 1971, at 53, col. 1); the Presidential Commission on School Finance (id., Sept. 19,
1971, at 45, col. 1); and the U.S. Commissioner of Education (id., Sept. 1, 1971, at 17, col. 1).
Some of the interstate disparities were discussed in Levi, The University, The Professions
and the Law, 56 CALiF. L. R~v. 251 (1968).
166Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, memorandum and opinion at 10, No. 3-71 Civ. 243
(D. Minn., decided Oct. 12, 1971); Amid Curiae Brief of Stephen D. Sugarman et al. at
35-36, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Amici
Curiae Brief of Center for Educational Policy Research at 2, 19, id.; Coons at 324-25, 340-41.
It was precisely because Professor Kurland foresaw the adoption of a simple standard
(Kurland at 588) that he feared a judicial declaration of equality in public education

"will probably only be the creation of a greater problem ... ." Id. at 583.
167 Wan 58-59. See notes 51, 87, 106 and accompanying text supra.
168 See notes 169-97 and accompanying text infra.
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incorrect assumptions as to the abilities of localities, particularly cities,
to raise revenues for school support.
New York State's educational allocations system provides a good
example of the failure, as to its cities, of an effort to correct the inequities of the flat grant and foundation plans of subvention. For our
purposes, that failure is illustrative of the kind of fine tuning mechanisms that a realistic appraisal of urban needs and revenue-raising abilities would require.
Enacted in 1962, the New York scheme' 69 is classified as "percentage
equalizing.' 170 The basic general aid program operates essentially as
follows: a district's "actual valuation"' 7' of real property per unit of
weighted average daily attendance (WADA)172 is calculated. The district's "aid ratio" (the percentage of operating expenses per pupil to a
ceiling of $860 that the state will absorb) 173 is computed in inverse
proportion to the ratio of the district wealth figure and the state's
average actual valuation per unit of WADA. 174
On the surface, the comparison of district wealth to average state
wealth seems a vast improvement on traditional foundation plans. 75
The state's "big six"' 76 cities have not found it so, however. Under the
formula, New York City's "aid ratio" for 1971-1972 is .253. The statewide average ratio is .490, the average ratio for districts outside the
"big six" being .603.177 The "big six" receive less aid per pupil than all
other types of districts while paying more tax dollars per pupil. 78 The
end result is a lower average total expenditure per child in the cities. 7 9
The explanation is, quite simply, that under the formula New
York's large cities appear to have greater revenue-raising abilities than
do other districts, that is, they have higher valuations per unit of
169 N.Y. Sass. LAws 1962, c. 657 (N.Y. EDUC. LOW § 3602 (McKinney 1970)).
170 See notes 71-78 and accompanying text supra. New York's plan, as wil become evident in the text, seems actually to be a foundation plan with the twist of a fairer
method of calculating ability.
171 "Actual valuation" incorporates a correction for local assessment variables. N.Y.
EDuc. LAW § 8602.1.c (McKinney 1970).
172 The "weighing" of average daily attendance involves a cost correction for different
grade levels. Thus, half-day kindergarteners "count" for half the WADA of the base unit;
full-day kindergarteners and first through sixth grades count for 1.00 of the base. High
school students "count" for 1.25 the base WADA. Id. § 8602.2.a. The statutory scheme
actually involves a further refinement of this figure to determine "resident weighted
average daily attendance" (Id. § 8602.2.e), a factor which does not affect the analysis here.
173 Id. § 8602.5.b.
174Id. § 8602.3.
175 See notes 69-70 and accompanying text supra.
176 Albany, Buffalo, New York, Rochester, Syracuse, and Yonkers.
177 CONFERENCE OF LARGE CITY BOARDS OF EDUCATION, PROGRAM 1971, 22 (1971). [here-

inafter PRoRAM

1971].

178 Id. 6, 7.

179 N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1971, at 1,col. 8.
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WADA. 8 0 The boards of education of the "big six" contend, however,
that appearance does not correspond to reality because the local ability
index fails to take account of the following factors that drain city resources disproportionately: non-school services,"' special education
needs, higher costs and tax exempt properties. Additionally, they argue
that the operating expense ceiling is unrealistic and the WADA measure operates to reduce city allocations without commensurate cost
1 2
reductions. 1
The problem of "municipal overburden" is factually corroborated
in New York by a breakdown of the 1970-1971 local property tax
dollar. Nearly 76 cents of every "big six" dollar (78 cents of every
New York City dollar) went to non-school purposes (police, fire sanitation, etc.); the average non-school cost for other local governments was
49.1 cents of the tax dollar.18 3 The state's failure to measure "municipal
overburden" is particularly troubling when one considers that the nonschool services of the municipal centers are provided for large numbers
of non-residents. This commuter population reaps the double benefit
of city services without cost and increased state school revenues in their
84
home districts.
Two formulae adjustments that would correct the ability index
according to the degree of "municipal overburden" have been proposed.
One would calculate wealth as "full property value per capita" rather
than "full property value per pupil."'185 The other suggestion would
adjust the wealth index by a "value reduction ratio." The ratio would
be computed on the basis of a comparison of the percent of municipal
taxes per WADA required for non-school purposes and the statewide
88
non-municipal average.
City boards of education also support a disproportionate share of
high cost special education programs. Thus, while New York's "big six"
180 The situation is not unique to New York's cities. The lack of immediately apparent disparities in assessed valuations per pupil may have hurt the Cook County plaintiffs
in Mclnnis. Chicago, it has been pointed out, is not a low-wealth district and was,
therefore, a poor location from which to launch an attack on the Illinois funding scheme.
Coons at 411.
'S1 This phenomenon is generally referred to as "municipal overburden." Coons at
342-43.
182 PROGRAM 1971 passim.
183 Id. at 21. (source: New York State Division of Municipal Affairs, Dep't of Audit
and Control).
184 In fairness, it should be noted that non-residents working in New York City pay
a commuter income tax to the city. Residents also pay a city income tax, of course, in
addition to real property taxes.
185 PROGRAM 1971 3, 11.
186 P. MORT, UNIFICATION OF FISCAL POLICY IN NEW YORK STATE IN PERSPECTIVES ON
THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 345-46 (C. Benson ed. 1963).
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educate 38 percent of the state's total pupil population, that percentage
includes 63 percent of the state's handicapped, 86 percent of children
receiving Aid to Dependent Children and 65 percent of full-time vocational students. 87 Yet, average daily attendance is not weighted to account for these extra costs.'18
The WADA measure, used in virtually all cost calculations, has
other difficulties. Large cities tend to have high dropout and absentee
rates, 189 a factor which does not reduce costs because programs must
be drawn up on the basis of enrollment. New York's large city boards
have proposed that the measure be changed to weighted average enrollment and be further adjusted to include summer and continuing education enrollments' 90 presently unaccounted for.191
The above discussions give some idea of the multiplicity of considerations essential to a fair assessment of urban ability to support
educational programs. 192 Because (1) the primary target of Serrano was
discrimination against districts having low per-pupil valuations and (2)
the equal protection theories advanced by school finance theorists deal
only with "the grosser objective aberrations of existing systems,"' 93 it
is clear that Serrano per se will not be of great benefit to large city
districts having characteristics similar to New York's "big six."
Serrano will, however, have the effect of forcing reappraisals and
94
major overhauls of school financing systems throughout the country.
It also marks the entrance, in a major role, of the judiciary into the
school finance arena. These two aspects of the California decision do
have great significance for city schools.
Whether the impact will be beneficial remains to be seen but an
initial, perhaps cynical, reaction is that the latter aspect is more promising. The cities have not fared well legislatively in the past. 195 If similar
187 PROGRAM

1971 5, 6.

188 N.Y. EDUc. LAw § 3602.2 (McKinney 1970).
189 PROGRAM 1971 15.
190 Id. 2, 9.
191 N.Y. EDuc. LAw. § 3602.2 (McKinney 1970).
192 The list is far from complete. Some other factors that should be evaluated are
percentages of tax exempt properties, constitutional or statutory limitations on local tax
effort, and differentials affecting capital improvement costs (e.g., site costs). Nearly 40
percent of valuations are exempt from taxation in New York's large cities (47.7 percent
in Albany) while the non-"big six" average is 20.6 percent. PROGRAM 1971 23 (source: New
York State Division of Municipal Affairs, Dep't of Audit and Control). Despite their
greater costs, New York's cities are hampered in their fund-raising efforts by constitutional
proscriptions. New York City's real property tax ceiling is two and a half percent (N.Y.
CONST. art. VIII, § 10(f); the other large cities are limited to a two percent effort (Id.

§ 10(b)); the rest of the state's localities may tax at four percent (Id. §§ 10(b) & (c)).
Coons at 344.
194 See note 163 supra.
195 See, e.g., New York's statutory scheme described in text accompanying notes 170-92
193
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insensitivity is displayed in revising present finance schemes, the fiscal
plight of city taxpayers, if not the school budgets, could actually be
worsened.9 0
A new judicial willingness to scrutinize school finance schemes,
particularly under the equal protection clause, may well benefit the
cities and their schools; Serrano'smore immediate effect will not, however. With regard to this, two matters should be briefly discussed.
The cities' unequal share of the "special education" burden has
already been noted. 197 Yet, Mclnnis9" and Burruss9o would seem to
preclude an "individual needs" equal protection attack on inequitable
20 0
financing of this burden.
There is, however, another type of needs standard, not condemned
by Mclnnis and Burruss, which might serve the cities well. This is an
"area needs" approach. That is to say, an attack might be made on a
state financing scheme that failed to take account of the categorical and
more objectively obvious needs of an entire district. Burruss is puzzling
on this issue: The three-judge court quoted from a section of the complaint that expressly referred to just this type of standard:
The Act ... utterly fails in any manner or to any extent what-

soever.., to relate to any of the variety of educational needs of
the several counties and cities of the State of Virginia-much less
supra. As a further example, former subdivision 8(c) of New York Education Law section
3602 providing a 17.5 percent size-related cost correction for New York's large city districts
was repealed. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1969, c. 183, § 14, eff. July 1, 1970.
100 If, for example, a statewide uniform rate property tax for education were levied
without taking account of municipal overburden and other factors cited above, it is
quite conceivable that total city property taxes would rise, for the education component
almost certainly would. See note 183 and accompanying text supra. A proposal for such
a tax will reportedly be advanced this month by the majority of New York's Commission
on the Quality, Cost and Financing of Education ('The Fleischmann Commission"). N.Y.
Times, Oct. 18, 1971, at I, col. 8. The statewide uniform rate education property tax is
apparently only an interim proposal, however, and the Commission's majority favors an
eventual shift of the total education finance burden to income or other taxes viewed as
more clearly indicative of individual wealth. Id. In the event of such a shift, city residents
might still fare poorly if the individual share of "municipal overburden" (reflected in
city income taxes and non-school city property taxes) is not considered.
107 See text accompanying note 187 supra.
108 McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill.
1968), aff'd mem. sub nom. McInnis
v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
199 Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd mem., 397 U.S. 44
(1970).
20oConsidering the attacks that have been made on Mclnnis and Burruss, this may
not be an unassailable proposition, however. See, e.g., Coons at 308-09, 351-52 n.134. One
area that might be ideal for distinction is precisely that posed by the special education
burden of the cities in regard to the mentally and physically handicapped, vocational
education and non-English speaking students. Those needs are readily identifiable and
quantifiable and so do not present the judicial unmanageability problems of an acrossthe-board individual needs standard cited by the Mclnnis and Burruss courts,
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weigh the relative acuteness of these needs or provide any sort of
balanced response to them .... 201
In its opinion, however, the court ignored the "area needs" allegation, interpreting it as a request for an "individual needs" standard
and asserting non-justiciability on the basis of that understanding:
[T]he courts have neither the knowledge, nor the means, nor the
power to tailor the public moneys to fit the varying needs of these
students throughout the State. 202
If this analysis is correct, it cannot be said that the Burruss opinion ruled out an "area needs" standard even though that claim was
made in the complaint.
A final point should be made in relation to the impact of Serrano
on city schools: In addition to its forced reappraisal of statutory financing systems, the decision promises to inspire entirely new approaches
to the subject of school funding. It has, for example, been proposed
that the federal government assume the administration and financing
of the country's 25 largest urban school systems. 20 3 Without commenting
on the merits and ramifications of that particular proposal, hopefully
it indicates that a whole range of original suggestions will be brought
to bear on the problem of city schools-and, indeed, all schools-in
the wake of Serrano.
CONCLUSION

The public school has been described as "the most powerful agency
for promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic people" 20 4
and "the symbol of our democracy and the most persuasive means for
20 5
promoting our common destiny."
So long as present financing schemes perpetuate the inequities of
the past, that statement can be no more than the expression of an ad-

mirable but unrealized ideal. Each of the states now has, in effect,
a series of school systems differing radically in the quality of education
offered.
It is not difficult to conclude that educational finance is one of the
few genuine equal protection frontiers remaining. From that perspective,
2013 10 F. Supp. at 573 (emphasis added).
202 Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
203 The proposal was made by Dr. Mark R. Shedd, Philadelphia's Superintendent of
Schools, in testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity. N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1971, at 26, col. 4.
204 Illinois ex re,. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 833 U.S. 203, 216 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
205 Id. at 231.
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Serrano v. Priest represents a tremendous exploratory step forward.
The standard adopted by Serrano should not, however, be regarded as
the final word on the parameters of constitutionally acceptable finance
schemes. It is submitted that the standard 20 6 and two-pronged litigation
approach 20 7 suggested in this Note would, in fact, be more satisfactory
both in terms of meeting the fourteenth amendment mandate and in
achieving the desired result.
The practical problems that will accompany a decision for educational equality should not be minimized. In particular, the greatest
legislative attention and ingenuity will be required to maintain quality
and decentralized decision-making and to ensure that revenue-raising
ability is fairly calculated. The fact that the advocates of education
finance reform have been exceedingly careful to accommodate these
concerns should, however, be encouraging as to the probability that a
judicial resolution of the matter will ultimately achieve the objective
envisioned by Mr. Justice Frankfurter.
200 See text accompanying notes 127-29 supra.
207 See notes 154-61 and accompanying text supra.

